Have you ever wondered why nuclear disarmament attempts always fail? Or why we have a festering problem of "free-riding" when it comes to public goods? Or on a fundamental level, why is it said that we can't live peacefully in the absence of a state formed on the basis of a social contract? This article tries to explain these phenomena by borrowing some ideas from the yet developing but fascinating branch of social sciences called Game Theory, devoted to studying strategic decisions. Ideas from the game theory have very wide applicability and can help us understand many social situations. "Prisoners' Dilemma" is one such idea which I'm going to use to explain the need for social cooperation or theoretically a "social contract".
To illustrate what this dilemma is all about, let's turn to one of its classic representations given by one of its earliest developers A. W. Tucker:
Suppose there are two prisoners A and B, suspects of a major
crime, taken into custody for interrogation. They have been put in separate
cells and are being questioned. Interrogating officers offer a deal to both A
and B to make them confess. Here is what they say to A:
We know you have committed this crime. We can prove it and
keep you in jail for 1 year. Though if you testify against B you'll be released
immediately. But if B testifies against you and you keep quiet, you will go to
prison for 15 years. If both testify against each other, both will face a
sentence of 7 years.
The situation becomes more clear if the information is
presented in the form of a "pay-off matrix" as follows:
What do you think the prisoners will do? Probably you may
have guessed that keeping their mouths shut is the best option available for
them. But think about it, if A has even the slightest belief that B is not
going to confess then he will happily confess and be let off completely. Also,
if A is going to consider the mutual interest and keep his mouth shut, then
there is this looming fear of B's confession which will put him behind the bars
for 15 years. Therefore, if A thinks rationally, for him the best bet is to
confess. Because this way if B turned out to be a sucker A will be released
immediately and even if B confessed, it's better for A to serve 7 years of
imprisonment than 15 years. It appears that regardless of what B does, it's
better for A to confess. To confess here is A's "dominant strategy".
In game theory, what we call the dominant strategy is the one that is better
than all other available strategies no matter what strategy the other player
chooses. It's said that if you have a dominant strategy, just use it. Also, B
will think no differently than A. He has the same deal, so he'll reason the
same way, and he'll, too, end up confessing. So, to confess is the dominant
strategy for both the prisoners. Instead of getting out in 1 year, now they
will have to serve for 7 years. This is the dilemma that rational calculations lead
to an action that is against the common good.
At this point, one can't help but think of the ways through
which this dilemma can be overcome. Should the prisoners have signed an
agreement, before they got caught, to avoid it? Should they have created the
prospect of a suitable punishment to be inflicted in case of defection to deter
the temptation to cheat? The answer is yes. These are some preliminary ideas for
resolving the dilemma. Looking closely, you may find that the solutions
mentioned here like an agreement, which everyone agrees to, and the scope of a
suitable punishment in case of non-compliance constitute the basics of any
social contract.
Now consider the situation of the Hobbesian man in the state of nature prior to the formation of civil society and the social contract. You'll find many parallels with the situation of prisoners of the prisoners' dilemma. First, let's look at some basic assumptions that Hobbes makes about the state of nature:
1.
Human
beings have a restless desire for power. They are always in search of power.
And, the search for power is, by nature, competitive.
2.
Human
beings are, by nature, equal. They possess roughly the same level of strength
and skill.
3.
In
the state of nature there is a scarcity of goods.
What logically follows from these assumptions is that in the
state of nature one must be prepared for self-preservation at any cost. Since
there is a scarcity of goods and people who want to acquire those goods are
equal, no one can be sure that they will not be invaded by others. If I lowered
my guard on self-preservation, my neighbour will likely invade my property
because, in the state of nature, attacking others is the surest way of getting
what you want. But so would I, if he has lowered his guard on preserving his
property. Self-preservation will drive us both to fight each other. To desist
him, there is only one way for me that is to attack him first. And my neighbor
too will think on parallel terms and would want to attack me first to desist
me. Again here, the dominant strategy for both of us is to attack the other.
Again, we will be led to an action that is against the common good. Had we had
chosen cooperation we both would have been better off.
Now we can understand why Hobbes says that the rational
human actions will make the state of nature a battlefield. What's the solution?
How can this dilemma be overcome? The sole escape, according to Hobbes, is to
abandon the state of nature and form a social contract to enforce cooperation
and therefore peace. A designated sovereign should be invested with whatever
powers required to preserve properties and other rights. Thus, a social
contract, granting sovereign guarantee to people that their rights will be
protected, is justified because it gives strong incentives to people for social cooperation required to
resolve the dilemma.
Another poignant example of the prisoners' dilemma can be found in the failure to achieve nuclear disarmament. Consider two sovereign states P and Q. Both want an upper hand over each other. Sovereign states exist in an international setting that is very similar to the Hobbesian state of nature. For they don't transfer their arms and their sovereignty to an overarching authority or a super-state. Think about how peace is going to be established between these two countries. Both P and Q will have to choose between two strategies - "arming" and "disarming"- without knowing what the other is going to choose. The payoff matrix for both countries is given below:
Again, they both will end up arming themselves as both will be caught on the
horns of the dilemma. For P, since it doesn't know whether Q will arm or
disarm, the best option is to arm itself so that it can avoid defeat. And of
course, it may even get the victory if Q turned out to be a sucker. Country Q too will
reason on parallel terms as P and will opt for arming itself no matter what P
does. Thus, even if the best case for both of the countries is to disarm
themselves and establish costless peace, they will both go for the second-best
option which is the armed peace or peace at a cost. What it tells us is that
cooperation between countries to achieve costless peace is highly unlikely in
the absence of an overarching authority or a super-state like structure that
can enforce cooperation. This is why we need international organizations like
the UN, WTO, IMF, etc.
Also, this is in contrast with what the free market
economists tell us that individuals acting in their self-interest will always
do better as a whole. One good example in this regard is this: suppose we live
in a country where there is an acute power shortage. The government asks us to
voluntarily help them in fighting the power deficit. I would reason like this:
if everyone else is going to conserve power then it is better for all of us. So
I should not worry about power conservation because in a country of millions a
mere individual's extra consumption will not make any difference. But what if
everyone is going to reason the same way. If everyone is going to think that
his/her efforts are pointless in front of the population of millions, the
problem will only be exacerbated. This is called the public goods problem,
broadly equivalent to what is called the multi-person prisoners' dilemma.
Again, the solution is to enforce cooperation that can be easily done through
government intervention. Government through its coercive measures is likely to
succeed in enforcing cooperation and thus, promoting the common good.
If you've seen the film The Dark Knight, remember its
jaw-dropping climax where two ferrying boats, rigged with explosives, are
leaving the city. One is carrying average civilians while the other is full
of hardcore criminals of the city. Recall what conditions Joker gives them if
they have to survive. He informs them that one must detonate the other before
midnight or he'll blow up all of them. Here Joker assumes that people on the
boats will act in their self-interest and will blow up each other. Isn't the
situation here strikingly similar to that of the first example of prisoners'
dilemma we saw earlier involving the two prisoners? However, as you know, Joker
fails in realizing his evil intentions because on one of the boats a prisoner takes the detonator and throws it
out of the window and people on the other boat too don't find the courage to
press the detonator. How did they overcome the dilemma? Batman gives the answer
when he tells the joker: “This city just proved that it’s full of people ready to
believe in good.” The sense of justice, morality, and the belief in the soul of
Gotham was so entrenched in them that even the strongest provocation didn't
deter them from following the right course of action and choosing social
cooperation. Instead of acting in the pursuance of self-interest, they went for
the common good rescuing everyone from the evil designs of Joker.
VIKRAM RAJ
B.A. LL.B. (Hons), 1st Year
Great work...
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